Autocratization

Autocratization.

or to write it out in full,

Autocratization by gradual institutional erosion.

Not necessarily a common household word. But easy enough to understand when you break it down.

• Autocratization
  The process by which a political system moves away from democracy toward autocracy. Crucially, it doesn't require arriving at full autocracy; the movement itself is the phenomenon. A country can be autocratizing while still holding elections and maintaining formal democratic structures.
• gradual
  Occurring in small, incremental steps over time rather than through a single rupture. Each step is individually deniable or defensible. The significance is cumulative, not episodic. This is what distinguishes the modern phenomenon from coups — there is no single moment you can point to as "the day democracy ended."
• institutional
  Pertaining to the formal and informal structures that organize political life: courts, legislatures, electoral bodies, the civil service, the press, political parties, constitutional norms. Institutions are the rules of the game plus the organizations that enforce them. "Institutional" erosion is distinct from, say, cultural or economic change — it specifically targets the mechanisms that constrain and distribute power.
• erosion
  Degradation from within rather than destruction from without. The institution remains nominally present — the court still exists, elections still occur, the free press is not abolished — but its functional capacity to constrain power is hollowed out. The shell persists while the substance drains away. This is why erosion is harder to see and resist than demolition.

In other words,

A slow, incremental hollowing-out of the structures that distribute and constrain power — in a direction that concentrates it.

Simply put,

We're all fucked...with our eyes wide open.

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Can you Spot the Autocrat?

There once was a time where we could all easily point to an autocrat and identify him (and yes, they were mostly male).

• They spoke like autocrats
• They acted like autocrats
• And quite frankly, they even looked like autocrats

But today, pointing at an autocrat has become increasingly difficult. You know someone's an autocrat in your gut, but in your head...it's a lot more difficult to prove.

Below is a photo taken from the 2025 G20 Summit that was held in South Africa. Can you spot the autocrats?

Of the G20 leaders in 2025,

• 4 govern clear autocratic systems
• 2 govern systems that many scholars consider to be drifting toward authoritarianism
• 14 govern democratic systems

But the category of “democracy” is not as uniform as it first appears.

Some G20 countries are widely considered stable liberal democracies regardless of which party is in power. Their institutions—independent courts, competitive elections, and strong protections for civil liberties—remain broadly trusted across the political spectrum.

These include:

• Australia — Anthony Albanese
• Canada — Justin Trudeau (and his successor Mark Carney)
• France — Emmanuel Macron
• Germany — Olaf Scholz (and his successor Friedrich Merz)
• Mexico — Claudia Sheinbaum
• South Africa — Cyril Ramaphosa
• United Kingdom — Keir Starmer

That leaves a smaller group of democracies where political debate increasingly centers on the health of democratic institutions themselves. These countries still hold competitive elections and maintain constitutional systems, but they are also experiencing intense polarization, institutional stress, or accusations of democratic backsliding.

• Argentina — Javier Milei
• Brazil — (Jair Bolsonaro →) Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
• Italy — Giorgia Meloni
• Japan — Fumio Kishida (→ Sanae Takaichi)
• South Korea — Yoon Suk Yeol (→ Lee Jae-myung)
• United States — Joe Biden (→ Donald Trump)

Let’s look at some of these leaders more closely. The goal here is not to label individuals as autocrats or democrats, but to examine the political systems they operate within and the pressures those systems are facing.

South Korea — Yoon Suk Yeol.

South Korea is widely considered a stable liberal democracy, but its politics have become increasingly polarized in recent years. In December 2024, President Yoon briefly declared martial law amid a political crisis, a move that sparked immediate constitutional backlash and mass protests. The declaration was quickly reversed, but the episode highlighted how even strong democratic systems can experience moments of institutional stress. He has recently been sentenced to life.

Brazil — Jair Bolsonaro (→ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva)

Brazil provides a different example. Former president Jair Bolsonaro repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of Brazil’s electronic voting system and clashed with the judiciary and electoral authorities. After losing the 2022 election, some of his supporters stormed government buildings in Brasília in January 2023. Brazil’s institutions ultimately held, and power transferred peacefully to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, but the episode demonstrated how democratic norms can be tested even when constitutional structures remain intact.

Italy — Giorgia Meloni

Probably the least concerning but, Italy’s current government, led by Giorgia Meloni, has raised concerns among some observers because of her party’s historical roots in post-fascist political movements. However, Italy remains a parliamentary democracy with competitive elections, an independent judiciary, and strong European institutional constraints. The debate surrounding Meloni largely centers on ideological direction rather than structural democratic breakdown.

But if we step back and look at Europe as a whole, the picture becomes more complicated.

• Hungary, Viktor Orbán (Fidesz)
  Longest-serving right-wing nationalist government in the EU; focuses on "illiberal democracy" and sovereignty.
• Slovakia, Robert Fico (Smer-SD)
  Leads a populist coalition with the radical-right Slovak National Party; skeptical of Ukraine aid and critical of EU centralization.
• Austria, Herbert Kickl (FPÖ)
  Following a historic election win in late 2024, the Freedom Party has become a dominant force, pushing "Fortress Austria" migration policies.
• Czech Republic, Petr Fiala (ODS)
  Part of the ECR family; maintains a conservative, Euroskeptic (but pro-NATO) stance.

And then there are those not quite in power, but troublingly close:

• France, Marine Le Pen (National Rally)
  Though currently in opposition, her "National Preference" platform is viewed by rights groups as inherently discriminatory; she has recently adopted "anti-system" rhetoric similar to Donald Trump, framing her 2026 legal challenges as a "judicial witch hunt" to disqualify her from the 2027 presidency.
• Germany, Alice Weidel (Alternative for Germany - AfD)
  Classified by German domestic intelligence as "proven right-wing extremist" in several states; the party's platform includes "remigration" plans for citizens of foreign descent and a rejection of the current constitutional "firewall," leading to debates about a potential party ban to protect democracy.
• Netherlands, Geert Wilders (Party for Freedom)
  Continues to exert "authoritarian populism" from within and outside the coalition by frequently attacking the "liberal elite" in the judiciary and media; he remains committed to a "constitutional emergency" declaration to bypass standard parliamentary procedures on migration.

Japan — Sanae Takaichi

Japan presents a different type of democratic debate. The country has long been governed predominantly by the Liberal Democratic Party, leading some analysts to describe Japan as a “dominant-party democracy.” While elections are competitive and civil liberties are strong, the persistence of one party in power for decades raises questions about the depth of political competition.

And we're left with one country:

United States — Joe Biden (→ Donald Trump)

But we'll get back to the United States a little later.

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Autocracy?

So what exactly are we talking about when we say 'Autocracy'?

Like many people, I've used the terms totalitarian, authoritarian, dictatorship, and fascist rather loosely. They were convenient labels for governments or institutions I instinctively disliked, because they threatened the values I hold dear —freedom of speech, rule of law, free and impartial elections . I rarely stopped to consider whether those words actually meant different things.

In hindsight, my usage was less analytical than emotional. These terms served more as signals of moral judgment than as precise descriptions of political systems.

But recent events around the world made me pause and look more carefully at the language I was using. What exactly do these words mean? Are they interchangeable, or do they describe fundamentally different forms of power?

That curiosity led me down a small rabbit hole into political science — and it turns out, as usual, that academic definitions and typologies don’t necessarily make things clearer.

One thing did become clear, however: there is no single word I can use to describe a form of government that my conscience instinctively recognizes as simply “wrong.”

Perhaps that is part of the reason such regimes persist. 

It is difficult to confront something when we cannot even name it clearly.

If a single word cannot capture the problem, perhaps a better approach is to ask a few simple questions.

My litmus test:

• Is the law applied equally to the ruler and the ruled?
• Is there a protected space for a private life?
• Does the minority have a path to becoming the majority?

Upon further research, I discovered that many people have wrestled with this same question. Thinkers like Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Hannah Arendt spent much of their lives trying to understand how destructive political systems arise and why ordinary people sometimes fail to resist them.

Bonhoeffer, writing from within Nazi Germany, famously explored what he called the problem of stupidity — the unsettling observation that people can become intellectually and morally disarmed under the pressure of authoritarian power. Arendt, studying the rise of Nazism and Stalinism, described the “banality of evil,” arguing that great crimes are often carried out not by fanatics, but by ordinary people who stop thinking critically about the systems they serve.

They were hardly alone in asking these questions. After the Second World War, an entire generation of scholars tried to understand why authoritarian systems emerge and how they maintain power. The psychologist Theodor W. Adorno studied what he called the authoritarian personality, exploring the psychological traits that make individuals more receptive to authoritarian rule. The political theorist Carl Joachim Friedrich helped develop one of the earliest systematic descriptions of totalitarianism, identifying features such as ideological control, centralized authority, and mass mobilization.

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V-Dem

More recently, political scientists have approached the problem from a more empirical direction. Scholars like Juan Linz, Barbara Geddes, and Steven Levitsky have tried to classify different types of authoritarian regimes and understand how they evolve. Instead of asking only why people obey, they examine the institutions that allow such systems to survive.

One of the most ambitious modern efforts to study political systems in this way is the work of the Varieties of Democracy Institute, often referred to simply as V-Dem.

V-Dem is a large international research project based at the University of Gothenburg and the University of Notre Dame. Rather than trying to place every country into a single label such as “democracy” or “dictatorship,” the project attempts something more granular: it measures the institutional components that make democracy possible.

To do this, V-Dem collects data from thousands of country experts and researchers and evaluates political systems using hundreds of indicators. These indicators are then combined into several major indices that capture different dimensions of democratic governance.

Among the most widely cited are:

• Electoral Democracy Index:
  Measures the integrity of elections, political competition, and suffrage.
• Liberal Democracy Index:
  Measures rule of law, checks and balances, and protection of civil liberties.
• Participatory Democracy Index:
  Measures how actively citizens participate in political life
• Deliberative Democracy Index:
  Measures whether political decisions are based on reasoned public debate rather than coercion or propaganda
• Egalitarian Democracy Index:
  Measures whether political rights and participation are distributed equally across society

Instead of treating democracy as a simple yes-or-no condition, V-Dem treats it as something that exists along multiple dimensions and degrees. This approach makes it possible to see not only whether democracy exists, but how it erodes.

According to V-Dem, this is the world according to the five primary indexes. Immediately we can see a few things;

1. Overall democracy has been increasing since 1900
2. You can see various dips and rises, which generally correspond to major outbreaks of war, financial crisis, and large political movements (e.g. Nazi regime post WWI, Communist regime post WWII etc.)
3. Democracy has been gradually losing it's hold after peaking in 2012

This isn't necessarily because traditional autocracies, like North Korea, China, Russia, or Saudi Arabia for instance, have become more autocratic (they're still as autocratic as they can be),

but because traditional democracies have been sliding towards autocracy, as you can see in the graphs below:

Without going into details, some alarming findings in the latest 2025 Democracy Report.

1. Autocracies now outnumber democracies

For the first time in over two decades, the world now has more autocracies than democracies.

• 91 autocracies
• 88 democracies

This marks a major reversal from the late 20th century, when democracy appeared to be expanding steadily.

2. Most of humanity now lives under autocratic rule

Even more striking than the number of regimes is the population affected.

• 72% of the world’s population (about 5.8 billion people) now live in autocracies.
• This is the highest level since 1978.

Only a small fraction of the world’s population now lives in liberal democracies.

3. The dominant regime type is now “electoral autocracy”

The most common system today is not classic dictatorship.

It is what V-Dem calls:

Electoral autocracy

These regimes:

• hold elections
• maintain constitutions
• keep legislatures

But they undermine the conditions required for real competition.

Typical tools include:

• media control
• harassment of opposition parties
• politicized courts
• manipulation of election rules

This is why modern authoritarian regimes often look democratic from the outside.

4. The main target of democratic erosion: freedom of expression

V-Dem consistently finds that attacks on media and expression are the earliest warning signs of democratic decline.

Freedom of expression is worsening in dozens of countries, making it one of the most common early indicators of autocratization.

This includes:

• media intimidation
• concentration of media ownership
• censorship laws
• harassment of journalists

5. Democracy is declining globally

The report describes the last two decades as part of a broader pattern:

“The third wave of autocratization.”

Key points:

• The global average level of democracy continues to decline.
• The democratic freedoms enjoyed by the average person are now roughly back to 1980s levels.

In other words, the democratic expansion that followed the Cold War has partially reversed.

6. Democratic decline usually happens slowly

One of the most important insights from the V-Dem data is that democratic breakdown rarely happens overnight anymore.

Instead it tends to follow a pattern:

1. Attacks on media and civil society
2. Weakening of courts and oversight institutions
3. Manipulation of election rules
4. Concentration of executive power

The institutions of democracy remain formally intact, but their ability to constrain power erodes.

The most striking insight from the V-Dem data is that authoritarianism today rarely announces itself openly. Instead, it often appears wearing the institutional clothing of democracy.

The United States is often treated as a special case in discussions of democratic decline. For decades it ranked among the world’s strongest liberal democracies. Yet the V-Dem data suggests that even long-standing democratic systems are not immune to the same patterns of institutional erosion seen elsewhere.

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USA Trump2.0

And that brings us back to the United States of America.

For most of the twentieth century, the United States told itself a very powerful story.

It was the world’s great democratic experiment. The country that expanded suffrage, dismantled formal segregation, and helped construct the liberal international order after World War II. Whether that image was always deserved is debatable — but for decades the underlying trend was real.

The data reflects it.

If you look at the V-Dem democracy indices, the United States spends most of the twentieth century climbing steadily upward. The expansion of women’s suffrage in 1920 shows up clearly in the chart. So does the long arc of civil-rights reforms in the post-war era. By the late twentieth century the United States sits near the top of the democratic world across almost every measure: electoral integrity, civil liberties, deliberation, participation.

For nearly a century, the direction of travel was unmistakable.

Up.

But the chart also tells a second story — and it’s harder to ignore once you see it.

The first break appears in 2001.

Then the larger one arrives in 2017.

2001 was 9-11, and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

2017 was when Trump became the 45th president.

Across multiple indices — liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, electoral democracy — the trajectory bends downward. Not a collapse. Not a coup. Something more subtle and, in some ways, more unsettling.

Erosion.

This is exactly the pattern political scientists now describe as autocratization by gradual institutional erosion. Democracy no longer tends to die in dramatic ruptures. Courts are not abolished. Elections are not cancelled. The press is not formally shut down.

Instead, the system slowly bends.

Norms weaken. Guardrails loosen. Institutions that once constrained power begin to strain under political pressure. The architecture of democracy remains standing, but its load-bearing beams start to creak.

That is what the chart is showing.

The United States is still a democracy. Elections still matter. Courts still operate. Opposition parties still compete for power.

But the long democratic ascent that defined the twentieth century has clearly stalled — and may now be reversing.

For a country that once imagined itself as the engine of democratic expansion, that is not a small change.

It is a warning.

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Salami Tactics (Szalámitaktika)

Salami tactics is a political strategy of eliminating opponents gradually rather than all at once. The metaphor comes from slicing a salami one piece at a time.

The term was coined by Mátyás Rákosi, who used the strategy to dismantle democracy in Hungary after World War II.

Rákosi later bragged that he had defeated his political rivals “slice by slice.”

Historical Context

After World War II ended, Hungary was occupied by the Soviet Union.

The Soviets supported the Hungarian Communist Party but communists initially had very little public support.

In the 1945 election:

• Non-communist parties won overwhelmingly.
• The communists received only about 17% of the vote.

Yet within a few years Hungary became a full Stalinist dictatorship.

How Rákosi Used Salami Tactics

Instead of abolishing democracy in one move, Rákosi dismantled it step by step.

1. Labeling Opponents as “Enemies”

Political rivals were accused of being:

• fascists
• collaborators
• reactionaries
• traitors

This justified removing them from politics.

2. Splitting the Opposition

Rákosi deliberately divided non-communist parties.

Moderates were pressured to cooperate while more independent figures were targeted.

Opposition parties slowly lost their leadership.

3. Arresting Key Leaders

Through control of the police and security services, communist authorities arrested or forced out important opponents.

For example:

• Béla Kovács was arrested by Soviet authorities in 1947.
• Other politicians were intimidated into exile or resignation.

Each removal weakened the democratic opposition.

4. Rigging Elections Gradually

Instead of canceling elections outright, the system was manipulated.

The 1947 Hungarian parliamentary election became known as the “blue slip election.”

Fraud tactics included:

fake voting permits

multiple voting

intimidation of voters

The communists expanded their power without openly abolishing elections.

5. Creating a One-Party State

By 1949 the process was complete.

Hungary became the:

Hungarian People's Republic

Opposition parties disappeared and the communist party ruled alone.

small changes

gradual shifts

temporary exceptions

...and one day you wake up in Nazi Germany.

Another word for Salami Tactics is:

Boiling the Frog

Some Food for Thought

Two parallel strategies. Decades apart.

Strategy 1:

1. National Humiliation and Crisis
2. A Fragile Democracy
3. Charisma and Propaganda
4. Gradual Radicalization
5. Fear and Conformity
6. Pre-Existing Prejudices
7. Real Material Improvements
8. The Conquest of Neighboring Nations to Provide 'Living Space'

vs.

Strategy 2:

1. Perceived National Decline and Cultural Crisis 
2. Polarization and Institutional Distrust 
3. The Cult of Personality and Alternative Media 
4. Normalization of Extreme Rhetoric
5. Social Tribalism and "Cancel Culture" Backlash
6. Modern Scapegoating and Identity Politics
7. Economic Populism and Deregulation
8. Complete and Total Purchase of Greenland, Kidnapping of a Foreign Leader and his Wife (Maduro), Assassination of a Foreign Leader and Members of his Family (Khamenei)

The two lists are amazingly similar. In fact they are parallels of each other.

One was actually executed...and brought the Nazi party to power in 1933.

The other is currently being lived.

1. Perceived National Decline and Cultural Crisis

"Make America Great Again"

In the 2025 State of the Union, the rhetoric shifted from policy to existential survival. The U.S. southern border wasn't just called "unsecured"—it was described as a "war zone" and the country as being "under invasion" by "terrorists" and "vicious criminals." This framing transforms political issues into a battle for national existence.

2. Polarization and Institutional Distrust

"Drain the Swamp"

The strategy has moved from debating institutions to dismantling their legitimacy. Throughout 2025 and early 2026, there has been a sustained campaign against the "Deep State" and the judiciary. Specifically, the administration issued disciplinary complaints and impeachment threats against federal judges who ruled against executive orders, framing the court system itself as an "enemy of the people."

3. The Cult of Personality and Alternative Media

"The Enemy of the People" (to define "other" media) or "Truth" (his own platform)

The "I alone can fix it" mantra of 2016 has evolved into a more absolute "Only I can do this" stance, reaffirmed at Republican conferences in early 2026. By bypassing traditional press and using Truth Social as a direct-to-base pipeline, the administration ensures that the "Leader’s" truth is the only truth his followers consume, shielding them from external fact-checking.

4. Normalization of Extreme Rhetoric

"Tell It Like It Is" (the brand used to frame extreme speech as "unfiltered honesty")

Language that was once disqualifying is now routine. In February 2026, the administration defended a social media post depicting the Obamas as apes as a mere "meme," refusing to apologize. This is a classic "normalization mechanism"—using shock to numb the public's moral compass until the extreme becomes the expected.

5. Social Tribalism and "Cancel Culture" Backlash

"The Silent Majority" or "The War on Woke."

The "backlash" has been codified into policy. In early 2026, the FCC issued threats to investigate or deplatform media critics, including late-night hosts like Jimmy Kimmel. This is framed not as censorship, but as "returning fairness" to a system supposedly biased against the "silent majority."

6. Modern Scapegoating and Identity Politics

"Build the Wall" or "Poisoning the Blood"

The rhetoric of "poisoning the blood" has transitioned into action. By October 2025, investigations confirmed that mass deportation sweeps had resulted in the wrongful detention of 170 U.S. citizens. The "othering" of specific groups—from immigrants to "woke" educators—serves to unify the "in-group" through shared fear.

7. Economic Populism and Deregulation

"America First or "Drill, Baby, Drill."

Executive Order 14192 (2025) established a "10-for-1" deregulatory mandate. By early 2026, the administration claimed a 129-to-1 ratio, eliminating thousands of federal protections. While framed as "freeing the economy," critics argue it removes the guardrails that protect the public from corporate overreach.

8. The "Complete and Total" Purchase of Greenland

"The Golden Dome" (the 2026 slogan for the missile shield used to justify the annexation)

The most striking parallel to historical territorial expansion is the current Greenland Crisis. In January 2026, the U.S. announced a 10% tariff on Denmark—rising to 25% by June—explicitly to force the sale of the island. Framed as a necessity for the "Golden Dome" (a hemispheric missile defense system), it mirrors the historical tactic of using economic and military pressure to acquire "living space" or strategic territory from neighboring nations.

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The Verdict

At some point, the accumulation of facts stops being a list and starts being a story.

In a single year: 225 executive orders, more than any president in American history. 622,000 people deported, many without due process. A record 73,000 people held in federal detention on any given day — the deadliest year for ICE custody on record. Two American citizens shot dead by federal agents on American streets, after which local law enforcement was blocked from investigating, and the victims were labeled domestic terrorists.

A sitting foreign president kidnapped from his capital by 150 American aircraft. A foreign head of state assassinated, along with members of his family. A NATO ally subjected to economic coercion to force a real estate transaction. Warrantless arrests in American cities. Peaceful protesters formally designated insurgents. Birthright citizenship — enshrined in the 14th Amendment for 150 years — challenged by executive order, now awaiting a Supreme Court ruling.

Congress was notified of none of the military operations in advance.

Each of these events, had it occurred in isolation, would have defined a presidency. Together, they happened across fourteen months — fast enough that the news cycle couldn't hold them, fast enough that outrage had nowhere to settle before the next arrived.

That speed is not incidental. It is the point.

This is not a piece about whether Donald Trump is an autocrat. That question, honestly, is less important than it might seem — because autocratization was never really about a single person. Rákosi was a person. The salami kept getting sliced long after anyone remembered his name. What matters is not the hand holding the knife. It is whether the knife keeps moving.

And that is a question about institutions. About courts that hold or bend. About a press that investigates or retreats. About a Congress that asserts its authority or quietly cedes it. About citizens who stay alert or gradually decide that exhaustion is easier than attention.

V-Dem doesn't measure presidents. It measures systems. And what the data shows — across decades, across countries, across every index they track — is that democratic systems rarely announce their own decline. They drift. They erode. They maintain the appearance of normalcy long after the substance has begun to hollow out.

The shell persists while the substance drains away.

We are not at the end of that process. The courts are still ruling. The opposition is still competing. The press is still publishing. People are still protesting in the streets, and the streets are still open to them.

But we are not at the beginning either.

So where does that leave us?

Probably sitting with discomfort. Which is, I'd argue, exactly the right place to be.

Not panic. Panic is just another form of disengagement — it feels like action while producing paralysis. Not denial either, for obvious reasons.

Just honest, clear-eyed attention.

The scholars who study this for a living — Levitsky, Ziblatt, the V-Dem researchers — are not in the business of prophecy. They don't know how this ends. What they know is how it has tended to go, elsewhere, before. And what they say, consistently, is that the single most important variable is not the strength of the leader pushing against democratic norms.

It is the strength of the people and institutions pushing back.

That's it. That's the whole ballgame.

So no — America is not an autocracy. Not yet. The press is free, though under pressure. The courts are independent, though strained. The bureaucracy is standing, though under assault. The states are standing, though increasingly contested. The people are free, though the edges are fraying.

None of those caveats are small.

And none of them are permanent.

If it walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck — you don't need to wait until it lays an egg to start paying attention.

You just have to be honest about what you're looking at.

The question is whether enough people are.