Killing Baby Hitler

Would you kill baby Hitler knowing what he becomes?

Recently, the Trump administration committed two acts that have put me into a moral conundrum; 

1. The forced removal of Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores from Venezuela.
2. The assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of Iran, by a joint Israeli-US air strike.

Neither Maduro nor Khamenei are 'good' people. In fact, they are the opposite; their policies and actions have directly caused irreparable harm to both their citizens, the countries around them, and in Khamenei's case, to the world beyond its borders (i.e. funding Hezbollah and Hamas, supporting the oppressive Assad regime, providing military support to Russia's invasion of Ukraine).

Yet, despite this I am deeply troubled by the fact that in both cases, the US didn't bother to follow any rules or norms. The very unilateral nature of the decisions and actions...seemingly justified only by power (and the whims of a President).

So today, I decided to delve a little deeper.

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1. International Law & the Use of Force

U.N. Charter (Article 2(4)): the core principle

Under the United Nations Charter, the use of force between states is generally prohibited unless:

1. Self-defense in response to an armed attack.
2. Authorization by the U.N. Security Council.

There is no legal basis in the Charter to justify unilateral strikes aimed at killing or removing another country’s leader as lawful in peacetime. Targeting a sitting head of state through military force, in most interpretations of international law, constitutes a violation of sovereignty and prohibition on the use of force.

This is why actions like these often draw accusations of “crime of aggression.” (Even when powerful states claim self-defense or other reasons, legal scholars widely debate the legality.)

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If a military strike against another state’s leadership cannot be tied to bona fide self-defense or Security Council authorization, it is typically considered unlawful use of force under the U.N. Charter.

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2. Assassination vs. Regime Change

Targeted killing (assassination)

International law does not provide a lawful unilateral mechanism for assassination of a foreign leader. Even in armed conflict, combatants — not civilian leaders who are outside direct participation — are lawful targets. Killing a foreign head of state specifically falls into a gray area that many legal scholars define as illegal without clear self-defense or council mandate.

Regime change

“Regime change” itself is not a lawful category under international law. If one state uses military force to overthrow another’s government without Security Council approval, it is usually interpreted as:

• A breach of the U.N. Charter
• Potentially a crime of aggression
• A violation of state sovereignty

This applies even if the removed leader is widely condemned or accused of serious crimes. International law intentionally separates the moral or political judgment of a leader from the legal norms that govern interstate use of force.

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3. What About US Domestic Charges?

In Maduro’s case, the U.S. is treating his detention and indictment as criminal law enforcement (charges of narcoterrorism) rather than an “executive removal” in violation of sovereignty — though many countries dispute that characterization and argue the intervention breached the U.N. Charter.

Ironically, this isn't the first time the US had used domestic charges to remove another country's head of state. In 1989, the US launched a full military invasion of Panama under President George H. W. Bush. Noriega was removed from power, eventually surrendered, and was brought to the United States to stand trial and was convicted on multiple counts — ultimately receiving decades in prison. The U.S. invasion was widely criticized internationally; the U.N. General Assembly called it a violation of international law. Many legal scholars argue it was not justified under the U.N. Charter, even if drug trafficking was the stated criminal basis.

It also begs the question around all those instances when the US decided not to act despite overwhelming evidence of wrongdoing; Pol Pot, Stalin, Mao, Baby Doc, Idi Amin, The Kim dynasty, Ceaușescu, Suharto, Leopold II, Mengistu Haile Mariam, Omar al-Bashir, Francisco Macías Nguema, Pinochet, Jorge Rafael Videla, Efraín Ríos Montt (this list is really, really long and covers only a fraction of leaders who committed atrocities).

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Domestic prosecutorial charges against a foreign leader do not by themselves make the capture lawful in international law. Whether a country can unilaterally conduct a cross-border operation to seize someone is a separate legal question from whether that person can be tried under domestic law.

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4. US Legal Frameworks on the President's Power to Use Force

Under U.S. law, there are three main pillars:

A. Article II of the Constitution

The President is:

“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.”

This has been interpreted — through practice and courts — to allow the President to:

• Use military force without a formal declaration of war
• Conduct limited strikes
• Engage in hostilities deemed in the national interest

Congress has declared war only 5 times. The U.S. has used force dozens of times.

So as a practical matter, presidents have broad unilateral power.

B. The War Powers Resolution (1973)

Passed after Vietnam to restrain executive power.

It requires:

• The President to notify Congress within 48 hours of introducing forces into hostilities.
• Withdrawal within 60–90 days unless Congress authorizes continuation.

Reality:

• Presidents often comply procedurally.
• Congress rarely forces withdrawal.
• It functions more as a reporting requirement than a hard restraint.

C. AUMFs (Authorizations for Use of Military Force)

Post-9/11 AUMFs (2001 and 2002) have been interpreted expansively.

Some administrations have used them to justify operations far beyond Afghanistan and Iraq.

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U.S. law gives the President very broad authority to use force abroad, especially if framed as:

• Self-defense
• Protection of national interests
• Ongoing armed conflict
• Enforcement of federal criminal law

There is no clear statutory clause that says:

“The President may not remove a foreign leader by force.”

The main constraint is political, not legal.

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5. Impact on Global Institutions

United Nations (U.N.)

• The U.N. Charter was designed to prevent unilateral uses of force.
• When powerful states act without Security Council authorization in ways that could be seen as aggressive, it strains the legitimacy of the entire system.
• Smaller states may feel that the norms only apply when convenient, undermining faith in the institution’s ability to protect sovereignty.

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The U.N. General Assembly or Security Council can debate, condemn, or call for ceasefires, but without Security Council consensus — particularly among permanent members — there is often no enforceable action.

International Criminal Court (ICC)

• The ICC prosecutes individuals for crimes like genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression.
• Major powers (e.g., the U.S.) are not full participants in the ICC system and often reject its jurisdiction over their nationals.
• Theoretically, a leader who orders unlawful aggression could be subject to ICC prosecution, but enforcement depends heavily on cooperation by states.

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The ICC has formal jurisdiction, but lacks direct enforcement power — especially over citizens of powerful states or in conflicts where powerful states object to its authority.

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6. Why This Matters?

My discomfort is rooted in a real legal and normative tension:

• There can be strong moral or security reasons why a leader is widely condemned.
• International law doesn’t grant unilateral right to use military force to remove them without violating sovereignty.

If states can bypass international processes at will, the system that governs peace and conflict becomes based on power, not law.

That has three broad implications:

1. Erosion of legal norms — The more powerful states ignore international prohibitions, the less binding those norms become in practice.
2. Legitimacy crisis — Smaller states and international institutions may no longer see the legal order as protecting them.
3. Instability — Actions framed as justified by one side can escalate into broader conflict and retaliation — as we’re now seeing regionally after the strike on Iran’s leadership.

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The Bottom Line

International law clearly prohibits unilateral killing or overthrow of another state’s leadership without Security Council authorization or clear self-defense justification. When such actions occur, they:

• Raise serious legal objections
• Undermine international norms
• Create political and security instability

My unease about the implications for world order is justified — it’s exactly the tension international law was designed to prevent, and such events force a reckoning with whether those laws are robust or brittle in practice.

Let me ask you, the reader, three questions:

1. Is law optional for the powerful?
2. Are norms instrumental rather than binding?
3. Does stability depend on discretion rather than rule?

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Baby Hitler, again.

...who gets to decide?

I guess my problem is that too often, the answer is: the one's with power.